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Zusammenfassung
Der Mangel an Alternativen und Insiderinteressen in
Finanzmarktreformen seit der Krise
Die Kreditkrise, ausgebrochen im Sommer 2007, hat
gängige Regulierungsmodelle und die ihnen zugrunde
liegenden politischen Institutionen grundsätzlich in
Frage gestellt. Gemessen an der fundamentalen Kritik
die seitdem an bestehenden Strukturen geäußert wor-
den ist, sind die Reformambitionen westlicher Regie-
rungen in diesem Bereich allerdings enttäuschend und
geben kaum Hoffnung, dass der Bedrohung durch zu-
künftige Krisen ernsthaft begegnet wird.
Diese Beobachtung generiert die zentrale Frage
dieses Beitrags: wie lassen sich die Reformschritte ver-
schiedener Regierungen, und insbesondere deren be-
grenzter Umfang, erklären? Unsere Analyse konzen-
triert sich auf die Reformpositionen die vier Regierun-
gen mit Schlüsselpositionen in globalen Finanzfragen
(USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland) im
Vorfeld der G20-Treffen 2009 eingenommen haben.
Vier Regulierungsfeldern stehen dabei zentral: Rech-
nungslegungsstandards, Derivathandel, Bankenregulie-
rung und Ratingagenturen. Der Beitrag nimmt dabei
sowohl bemerkenswerte Überlappungen der Regie-
rungspositionen sowie Unterschiede zwischen ihnen in
den Blick. Vor allem letztere erlauben Rückschlüsse
auf die treibenden Kräfte hinter Reformbemühungen.
Die Analyseergebnisse lassen sich wie folgt zu-
sammenfassen: Regierungen haben in internationalen
Verhandlungen die Wettbewerbsinteressen ihrer na-
tionalen Finanzdienstleister verteidigt. Das heißt nicht,
dass Industrieinteressen durchgängig in politische Po-
sitionen übernommen worden sind – nicht selten ha-
ben neue Regeln Bankprofite eher geschmälert. Viel-
mehr ist es der relative Einfluss der neuen Regeln auf
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gewesen, verglichen mit aus-
ländischen Firmen, der entscheidend war.
Gleichzeitig zeigt dieser Beitrag, dass die ver-
schiedenen Regierungspositionen sich alle innerhalb
Abstract
The credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007
has fundamentally challenged much financial regu-
lation and the political institutions that produced it.
Measured against the criticisms that have been
brought forth against previous financial governance,
the extent of governments’ overall reform ambitions
has been disappointing, generating little hope that
the threat of future crises is being tackled seriously.
Starting from this observation, this article asks:
what explains governments’ reform choices, and
thus also their limited ambitions? To explore this
question, this article focuses on the positions that
four governments central to global financial regula-
tion (the USA, the UK, Germany and France) have
taken in advance of the G20 meetings in 2009 across
four key issue areas in financial regulation: ac-
counting standards, derivatives trading, credit ratings
agencies and banking rules. It evaluates both the
overlap between positions across domains and gov-
ernments as well as the differences between them.
Such variation, we argue, provides key clues to the
overall drivers behind reforms – as well as their lim-
its.
The overall picture that emerges can be sum-
marized as follows: governments have been staunch
defenders of their national firms’ competitive inter-
ests in regulatory reforms. That has not necessarily
meant that they followed industry preferences across
the board – new rules that might dent profits were
imposed in several cases. It has been the relative
impact, compared to foreign competitors, that
counted in reform positions, not the absolute impact.
As this article also shows, these differences of
opinion have played out within the context and the
limits of the overall debates about thinkable policy
alternatives. In spite of fundamental criticisms of
pre-crisis regulatory orthodoxy, convincing and co-
herent alternatives have been forthcoming slowly at
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eines Rahmens bewegen, der auf ‚denkbare‘ Regu-
lierungsalternativen begrenzt ist. Ungeachtet der
Fundamentalkritik gegenüber dem seinerzeit gängi-
gen Regulierungsparadigma, die nach der Krise laut
geworden ist, mangelt es nach wie vor an überzeu-
genden, grundlegenden Alternativansätzen. Darum
sind viele Reformvorschläge weniger radikal ausge-
fallen als die Kritik, isoliert betrachtet, nahegelegt
hätte.
Schlagworte: Finanzmarktregulierung, private Ak-
teure, Kreditkrise, Banken.
best. This has made reform proposals less radical
than criticisms, seen on their own, might suggest.
Key words: Financial regulation; private actors;
credit crisis; capture.
1. Introduction
The credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has fundamentally challenged much
financial regulation and the political institutions that produced it (Financial Services
Authority 2009; High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU 2009; The War-
wick Commission on International Financial Reform 2009; Kessler forthcoming 2010).
Authors from widely differing backgrounds diagnosed flaws in pre-crisis regulatory
thinking and attacked the intellectual core of the prevailing ‘regulatory liberalism’ (Gam-
ble 2009, p. 153). Yet measured against these criticisms, the extent of governments’
overall reform ambitions has been disappointing, generating little hope that the threat of
future crises is being tackled seriously.
This observation is the point of departure for this article: what explains governments’
reform choices (and thus also their limited ambitions)? To explore this question, we focus
not only on shared government positions on necessary reforms but also on the differences
between them. Such variation, we argue, provides key clues to the overall drivers behind
reforms. It can be found both across countries and issue areas. France, for example, con-
tinues to favour more re-regulation than the UK. And while some countries seek restric-
tive rules for credit rating agencies or over-the-counter derivatives, others prefer funda-
mental reforms of accounting standards or the Basle capital adequacy regime. How can
we account for these differences?
The overall picture that emerges can be summarized as follows: governments have
been staunch defenders of their national firms’ competitive interests in regulatory re-
forms. That has not necessarily meant that they followed industry preferences across the
board – new rules that might dent profits were imposed in several cases. It has been the
relative impact, compared to foreign competitors, that counted in reform positions, not
the absolute impact.
As this article also shows, these differences of opinion have played out within the
context and the limits of the overall debates about thinkable policy alternatives. In spite
of fundamental criticisms of pre-crisis regulatory orthodoxy, convincing and coherent al-
ternatives have been forthcoming slowly at best. This has made reform proposals less
radical than criticisms, seen on their own, might suggest.
This paper proceeds in four steps. The following section develops a rough yard-stick
to allow a comparison of reform proposals and measures across policy domains. Section
three details the argument in theoretical terms and locates it in contemporary debates
about financial governance. Section four introduces the four policy domains central to
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this article – accounting standards, capital adequacy rules, credit rating agencies regula-
tion and derivatives regulation – and presents evidence on regulatory reform positions of
the four countries that have arguably taken the most prominent roles in global reform de-
bates: Germany, France, the UK, and the US. The choice for the four mentioned domains
follows from their centrality in public debates about sources of the crisis and key areas
for reform. At the same time, they exhibit variance across key dimensions that enable an
evaluation of potential explanations. Naturally, post-crisis reform is a moving target as
discussions continue both at the national level and in the G20 and other international fo-
rums. This article therefore concentrates on government reform positions at a key mo-
ment in the post-crisis reform trajectory: the preparations for the two G20 summits of
2009. It presents a snap-shot that allows us to understand better the drivers of the reform
process, even if its ultimate results are yet unknown. Section five concludes and com-
pares dynamics across the four policy domains.
2. An open door for regulatory reform
Leading liberal commentators such as Martin Wolf and Wolfgang Münchau, prominent
financiers such as George Soros, and major policymakers like Lord Turner, head of the
former British Financial Services Authority, have all voiced fundamental criticisms of the
pre-crisis financial market order (Soros 2008; Financial Services Authority 2009;
Münchau 2009). Drawing on the ideas of for example John Maynard Keynes (1964
[1936]; cf. Best 2004) and Hyman Minsky (2008 [1986]), many critics have questioned
the soundness of the paradigm underpinning pre-crisis regulation. Much of the criticism
has focused on ‘market-enhancing regulation’, which assumed markets’ efficiency and
their propensity to discover optimal prices for financial assets given abundant liquidity
and, crucially, sufficient information for market participants. Information asymmetries as
a prime cause of market failure had to be rectified through regulation, just as intra-
industry competition and liquidity might have to be supported through specific rules.
With such props in place markets could be trusted to spawn an efficient and relatively
stable financial system.
Critics have argued that markets are reflexive, meaning that market sentiment is in-
separable from any ‘objective’ economic reality (Soros 2008). Valuations of financial as-
sets should reflect observers’ judgements about future economic developments and other
market participants’ perceptions. At the same time, these valuations and the investment
decisions based on them shape future economic developments, for example by fuelling
market bubbles or spurring productive investment. As Keynes already recognized, and as
financial crises through the ages have demonstrated time and again (Kindleberger 1978;
Reinhart/Rogoff 2009), the resulting subjectivity pushes financial markets towards de-
structive boom-bust patterns rather than towards equilibrium. Regulation to address these
excesses would have to be ‘market-disciplining’ rather than market-enhancing.
The critics who have put reflexivity at the heart of their analyses of the financial cri-
sis have seemingly opened the door to wholesale overhaul of policy in diverse financial
market domains, including banking and derivatives regulation, the functioning of credit
rating agencies and accounting standards. Based on such criticism and its prominence in
public debates, one should expect that governments, eager to prevent future crises, would
seek reforms that rectify the intellectual deficiencies of previous regulatory regimes.
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When this article analyses variation across countries and policy domains, it therefore also
focuses on the degree to which reform proposals depart from the regulatory liberalism
that characterized pre-crisis policy and base new policy on an alternative regulatory para-
digm that takes market reflexivity seriously.
3. Reform politics in crisis times
In some policy domains, reforms have already been introduced; new EU rules on credit
rating agencies are one example. In many others discussions are ongoing. To the degree
that governments have incentives to reconcile divergent positions through bodies such as
the G20, or are even forced to do so in the context of the EU, eventual reforms will differ
from governments’ original preferences. This paper concentrates on these preferences,
however, to understand to which degree fundamental reform is even considered in na-
tional capitals, irrespective of the limits that collective action problems may impose on its
implementation. In this article’s assessment of regulatory reform politics in crisis times,
two strands of thinking provide most inspiration: dynamics of ideational change, and the
importance of firms’ competitive interests.
3.1 A lack of alternatives
The preceding section spelt out criticism of regulatory liberalism on the basis of an ac-
knowledgement of financial markets’ reflexivity. Such criticism is convincing and, with
the benefit of hindsight, much more than just academic musing on the cognitive funda-
ments and social construction of asset values and future expectations. Hall (1993),
building on Kuhn (1962), laid out how fundamental policy change requires the previously
dominant paradigm to have become dysfunctional. Faced with obstinate reality, it must
have hit an intellectual cul-de-sac and ceased to provide explanations with its own former
shortcomings. If ever there was a cognitive window of opportunity for a thorough rethink
of financial governance, the credit crisis opened it widely. What we know about cognitive
dynamics in economic policy would suggest radical reform to be possible, even if not
necessarily likely.
At the same time, the possibility of alternative paradigm implementation cannot be
assessed independent of the specific ideas newly put on the table. The indeterminacy of
financial markets that the reflexivity paradigm highlights may make the formulation of
convincing policy alternatives difficult. Minsky himself (2008 [1986]) saw no easy way
out of the boom-bust cycle he described. To the degree that regulatory policy relies on
objective assessments of adequate valuations – whether by credit rating agencies, banks’
internal risk models, derivative valuations or through accounting standards – it is not ob-
vious how policy could be formulated that remains true to market reflexivity. The ques-
tion, then, is whether beyond criticisms of the status quo, advocates of an alternative view
of financial market functioning have been able to sketch regulatory regimes that could
serve as templates for the radical reforms that they demand. Their absence need not pre-
clude radical reform, but off-the-shelf alternatives clearly make such changes easier. The
availability or otherwise of such alternatives in regulatory debates could thus explain why
in some domains we see fundamental reform proposals whereas marginal adaptations
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dominate in others. In any case, it remains an open question whether the crisis in financial
markets has engendered a regulatory rethink capable of generating far-reaching reform.
3.2 Competitive interests of firms
Variation across government responses may also stem from the competitive interests of na-
tional firms. The influence of firms’ preferences on financial regulation and international
agreements has been widely documented (Sobel 1994; Underhill 1997; Oatley/ Nabors
1998; Kroszner/Strahan 1999; Mügge 2006b; 2006a; forthcoming 2010b; Gadinis 2008).
This literature documents that it is not primarily firms’ short-term interest in boosting profits
that counts – absolute benefits as it were. What matters most are the relative benefits firms
derive from legal changes: do they fare better than their competitors?
There are good reasons to believe that the competitive interests of firms play a lesser
role now than they did before the crisis. Singer (2004) for example argued that in inter-
national efforts at rule harmonization financial regulators face a trade-off between en-
hancing financial stability and tilting the terms of cross-border competition in favour of
national firms. Following this line of reasoning, recent efforts to buttress the resilience of
global finance through regulatory reform would reduce the weight of firms’ competitive
interests.
In addition, industry-led financial liberalization has partially thrived on the lack of
awareness among citizens and their representatives of how essential a domain of policy-
making financial regulation is. Pre-crisis financial regulation was a form of insider poli-
tics (Mügge forthcoming 2010b). Capture of regulation by firms was possible because no
other societal stakeholders contested firms’ input into the policy process.
The financial crisis has politicized financial regulation across the developed world.
Several countries, including the UK, the Netherlands and the US, have held public par-
liamentary hearings with regulators, government officials and financial industry repre-
sentatives as witnesses. More than once, these hearings assumed a court-like character,
and private-sector witnesses were frequently recast as villains. Several ad hoc govern-
ment measures, including hefty taxes on banker bonuses, responded to a perceived public
awareness of and anger over private-sector failings. Whereas pre-crisis, governments
stressed the technicality of regulation and the importance of their own non-involvement,
they are now once more in charge of steering financial markets – for better or worse.
This politicization of regulation could have contradictory effects, however. On the
one hand, it may have alerted politicians to the importance of regulation and fomented
distrust towards industry opinion in regulatory matters and market-oriented regulatory
orthodoxy. In addition, the position of government officials eager to impose restrictions
on the financial industry has now been strengthened significantly. On the other hand, as
governments have reluctantly been drawn deeply into financial market governance – at
times through outright ownership of banks – they may feel even more responsible for
their firms’ fate than was true before. The realization that financial firms perform crucial
public functions may entice governments to watch out carefully for their survival, and
hence competitiveness. Ironically, the politicization of regulation may have given gov-
ernments incentives to safeguard the interests of their financial industries even more. It is
not obvious that a trade-off between stability and ‘competitiveness’ as highlighted by
Singer (2004) still structures post-crisis reform politics.
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Both arguments about paradigmatic change in policy and the preponderance of in-
dustry interests in financial governance may thus have to be re-evaluated in the post-crisis
context. The credit crisis has clearly shaken the prevailing regulatory orthodoxy, paving
the way for change. At the same time, the specific criticisms offered against pre-crisis
regulation may have been so fundamental that they are unable to generate practical policy
alternatives. And the crisis may have either weakened or strengthened firms as policy in-
siders. How each of these dynamics played out is for the empirical cases to tell.
4. The empirics: Country positions in four policy domains
This section compares government reform preferences across four domains: accounting
standards, credit rating agencies, capital adequacy rules and derivatives regulation. Faulty
rules in each of these fields have played a role in the financial crisis (Hellwig 2008; Kragt
2008; Financial Services Authority 2009; Siddiqui/Sekkelmann 2009), even if observers
differ in the relative weight they assign to them.2 The two G20 summits of 2009, one in
London in April and one in Pittsburg in September, challenged governments to articulate
policy positions for these fields. Only in few cases did these positions change throughout
2009. More often, governments voiced deeply-rooted attitudes that might change as a re-
sult of bargaining, but not through persuasion by better arguments.
4.1 Accounting standards
Fair-value accounting (FVA), the paradigm that replaced historic cost accounting over the
past two decades (Barlev/Haddad 2003), has drawn criticism for allegedly increasing
volatility of financial institutions’ profits and losses, at times pushing banks into bank-
ruptcy purely on the basis of adapted valuations of securities even if their cash flow posi-
tion was sound (e.g. Hellwig 2008, for a critical view see Laux/Leuz forthcoming 2010).
More seriously, as FVA forced financial institutions to treat corrections in the market
valuations of credit derivatives and loan portfolios as losses, it triggered asset sales and
curbs on lending, which themselves induced further falls in these assets’ market valua-
tions. And when market liquidity dried up, uncertainty spread about the value of banks’
assets, triggering a collapse in interbank lending. FVA was an essential link in the chain
of what Turner called ‘hard-wired procyclicality’ (Financial Services Authority 2009, pp.
22ff.). The apparent weaknesses of FVA (e.g. Perry 2009) thus opened the door for a
wide-ranging discussion about regulatory overhaul.
Practical reform discussions sidestepped profound theoretical debates. Empirically,
differences of opinion between governments in the field of accounting standards revolved
around two core questions: first, how strictly should mark-to-market accounting, a core
aspect of FVA, be applied to financial institutions’ assets? And second, how important is
it that accounting rules be harmonized globally, meaning in particular that the Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) drawn up by the IASB should be in line with
the rules of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the IASB’s US counter-
part?
In practice American authorities have been ambivalent about mark-to-market ac-
counting, even if they have continued to support it in principle. Since a remarkable shift
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of policy in favour of recognizing IFRS, they have stressed the importance of internation-
ally compatible accounting standards, and the FASB as well as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) proposed that US public companies should be able to use
IFRS in their SEC filings by 2014 (US Government Accountability Office 2009).
Already in September 2008, the SEC and FASB had issued guidance on ‘fair’ asset
valuation in thin or disorderly markets, granting firms more leeway to estimate asset val-
ues themselves rather than using mark-to-market. Despite this guidance, in March 2009
Congress threatened regulators, calling on them to improve the standards lest it would do
so itself (Hughes 2009). Although Geithner expressed his reservations about suspending
mark-to-market accounting (Braithwaite/O’Connor 2009) in April 2009 US regulators
allowed financial institutions to use their own cash flow models during distressed times
and to recognize only part of any drops in asset values in their income statements (The
Economist 2009; Guerrera et al. 2009). This move chimed with calls by large banks such
as Citigroup, Bank of America and Wells Fargo to relax accounting requirements, par-
ticularly for assets held for long periods of time (Guerrera et al. 2009). Investors, finan-
cial analysts and accountants themselves unsuccessfully opposed such rule changes, ar-
guing that they undermined investors’ confidence in published accounts.
The UK consistently came out in favour of sticking with mark-to-market accounting.
Backed in this stance by the UK government (HM Treasury 2009, p. 78), Lord Turner ar-
gued in his regulatory review that market freezing had stemmed less from faulty ac-
counting rules but from a lack of transparency (Financial Services Authority 2009). In
consequence, the UK officially favoured accounting reforms that forced firms, and banks
in particular, to disclose more information. This position mirrors that of the IASB itself,
which originally planned to extend mark-to-market accounting in response to the crisis.
However, as a result of enormous political pressure from Continental EU members, par-
ticularly France and Italy, the IASB introduced FASB-like exceptions in October 2008
and started revising the accounting standard in question after the G20 summit in London.
The German government had been sceptical of fair-value accounting applied to fi-
nancial assets even before the financial crisis. In 2007, as problems started to emerge,
Axel Weber as head of the Bundesbank argued that triple-A rated credit derivatives
should not be marked to the (falling) market as they were unlikely ever to suffer real
losses (Tett 2009, cf. Weber 2009a). Early in 2009 Germany floated plans to allow banks
to park impaired assets in separate entities and to allow them to use traditional German
accounting rules for these, meaning that they would be recorded at book – rather than
market-value (Benoit/Wilson 2009). According to the IMF, many German financial insti-
tutions had continued to use book rather than market values for their assets even after
IFRS had officially been introduced in the EU in 2007, implying (by IFRS-standards)
enormous unrecognized losses (Tett 2009).
Unsurprisingly then, German finance minister Steinbrück welcomed the relaxation of
IASB rules to align them with FASB requirements in October 2008 and the IASB’s promise
in June 2009 to develop a more adequate standard for financial instruments (Hekkin-
gen/Visser 2009). By July, however, he still felt reforms away from mark-to-market ac-
counting proceeded too slowly and, together with his French counterpart Lagarde, sent a
letter to Internal Market Commissioner McGreevy urging accounting standards to be altered
so that US and European banks could compete ‘evenly’ (Business World 2009).
Of the four governments, France was by far the most vociferous in its attacks on
mark-to-market accounting, extending criticism to the IASB and its governance structure
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itself. French prime minister Fillon not only argued that accounting should be less pro-
cyclical, but he also urged that the IASB should become more transparent and represen-
tative (Fillon 2009), calling into question the technocratic expertise on which its claim to
legitimate policy-making was built. Finance minister Lagarde concurred, calling for re-
form of both accounting rules and the IASB in April 2009. Regulators and supervisors
should have a say in IASB rule-making and, in line with Steinbrück’s position, account-
ing rules should be adjusted according to the assets’ liquidity and investors’ holding hori-
zon (Lagarde 2009a). President Sarkozy reportedly went as far as decrying the coup of
accounting rules by ‘technocrats’ as one of the causes of the crisis (Camerlinckx 2009).
That said, France continues to claim that in principle it supports fair-value accounting
as such (Betts 2009); it only wants it applied to the ‘appropriate’ activities, meaning that
long term assets should not be marked-to-market. Needless to say, such a selective appli-
cation of FVA undermines the whole intellectual rationale behind it. Yet the French posi-
tion mirrored that of large domestic financial firms such as BNP Paribas (Daneshkhu
2009) and Axa, France’s largest insurer (Daneshkhu/Hughes 2009). Whatever the ulti-
mate outcomes, the French government continues to stress that accounting rules between
US and Europe would need to be harmonized in the end (Noyer 2009a). In contrast to
pre-crisis calls for rule convergence, however, the argument no longer referred to in-
creased capital market efficiency but a ‘levelling’ of the playing field with US firms as
stricter IASB rules might disadvantage European banks (see Daneshkhu 2009) .
What is the overall picture that emerges? The UK proved the staunchest supporter of
FVA, with the US in an intermediate position and both Germany and France sceptical in
practice, if not in principle. US authorities, not least Congress, took a pragmatic approach to
accounting rules (cf. Mügge forthcoming 2011a), meaning that they were willing to dilute
FVA principles to grant national firms some respite. This decision, in turn, triggered calls
for reform by the French and German governments to protect the interests of their national
financial industries under the catch-all banner of creating ‘a level playing field’. In spite of
general scepticism towards FVA in both countries, however, they professed continuing sup-
port for the underlying principle. Neither offered an alternative approach, but argued in fa-
vour of relaxed rather than wholly different rules. Doubts about the underlying paradigm
were less important as a source of criticism than its practical market consequences.
In this light, the British position is surprising. On the one hand, Lord Turner in his
authoritative review clearly demonstrated his disaffection with pre-crisis regulatory ortho-
doxy; his analysis has been the most encompassing criticism of such orthodoxy from a sen-
ior policy maker in the countries studied here. On the other hand, Britain emerged as the
strongest supporter of FVA. But maybe Lord Turner’s weight in the British debate is also
the key to his position. Whereas the other three countries were willing to advocate half-
baked approaches with much lower coherence than FVA has had, the British position re-
flects most clearly that no wholesale alternative to FVA has been offered so far, and in con-
sequence favours an even stricter application of the prevailing paradigm rather than what in
the German, French and US positions amounts to little more than ‘muddling through’.
4.2 Capital adequacy
With hindsight, banks’ capital buffers relative to their assets are widely seen as having
been too thin. At the moment of most extreme indebtedness, the US median bank had
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borrowed 37 times its own capital (The Economist 2010); relatively minor re-valuations
of assets quickly eroded financial institutions’ capital bases and forced them into bank-
ruptcy. More capital relative to assets is considered a sine qua non for any future revision
of the capital adequacy regime.
Beyond simply thickening the capital buffer, two thorny issues stand out. First, be-
cause assets have been risk-weighted in the calculation of capital that needed to be put
aside to back them up, banks’ capital blankets grew thinner in relatively calm but poten-
tially excessive market-upswings when defaults were rare. In consequence, banks had and
used extra room to extend lending, further feeding the credit boom. As has been often
noted, capital requirements were pro-cyclical. Second, Basle II rules emphasized ‘sophis-
ticated’ forms of risk-weighting, relying either on external ratings, discussed below, or
banks’ own risk-assessment models (the internal ratings-based approach, see Tarullo
2008). The credibility of both methods has been seriously dented by the crisis, but thus
far at least, wholesale alternatives to calculating appropriate capital buffers are lacking.
For reform proposals targeting capital adequacy rules, the picture is somewhat differ-
ent than the one for accounting standards. In general, all countries agreed: banks need
more capital relative to assets, and the pro-cyclical effects of waxing and waning capital
buffers when they are risk-weighted should be countered. What was contentious, how-
ever, was whether measures to achieve this should be brought into Basle accord reforms
or whether separate agreements (if any at all) should formalize such rules.
Even before the crisis, European members of the Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision had been dismayed by the limited range of banks to which the US was willing
to apply such rules and its reluctance to implement the agreement fully. As was true for
accounting standards, EU governments were and are afraid that whereas they have tied
themselves to international standards, often legally binding through their incorporation in
or implementation through EU-wide rules, the US would seriously consider unilateral
regulatory solutions (cf. Mügge forthcoming 2011b).
Indeed, in the American regulatory discussion such unilateral moves have been consid-
ered viable options (US Government Accountability Office 2009), not least because of the
fragmentation of American regulatory institutions which might necessitate idiosyncratic
solutions. In line with the US decision to apply Basle II only to large, systemically relevant
institutions (Braithwaite/Guerrera 2009; Geithner 2009), extra domestic ‘safeguards’ have
been touted as key measures to strengthen the resilience of the American financial system.
In addition to the calculation of capital buffers ‘through the cycle’ (however that might
work), the US has focused on three further measures for international implementation: the
introduction of a leverage ratio (capital to non risk-weighted assets, cf. D’Hulster 2009), the
application of capital adequacy rules to a broader range of assets (Department of the Treas-
ury 2009a) and an increase in importance of tier-1 capital (Irish Independent 2009).
In the run-up to the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, this last proposal led to
conflicts with European countries, especially France and Germany. Before proposing al-
together new rules, these two countries argued, the US should first fully implement Basle
II (Agence France Presse 2009; Irish Independent 2009) and they insisted that leverage
ratio-rules should fall under the Basle regime (Guha 2009). In short, both countries wor-
ried that the Americans would opt out of global banking governance and pursue their
own, independent policy line.
In substance, the British position mirrored that of the US. Also in the UK, stronger
capital buffers were seen as the key to prevent future re-runs of the crisis (Financial
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Services Authority 2009), and authorities stressed the importance of smoothing out capital
requirements throughout the credit cycle (Financial Services Authority 2009, p. 62; HM
Treasury 2009). The British also saw added value in a leverage ratio and, crucially, ar-
gued that stronger capital bases should come in the form of shareholder equity – not un-
like Geithner’s emphasis on tier 1 capital.
In contrast to both the US and the UK, Germany continuously emphasized the im-
portance of the Basle accord as the backbone of banking regulation. In the summer of
2009 Steinbrück had indicated support for a temporary relaxation of capital rules (Tait et
al. 2009), complementary to his plea for looser accounting rules (Tett 2009). Overall,
however, Germany was in favour of letting the (potentially amended) Basle accord do the
trick. Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, warned in September not to dismiss the risk-
sensitive approach of Basle II and urged to wait with reforms until a Basle working group
had determined whether the regime had in fact stimulated pro-cyclicality (Weber 2009a).
Weber also made clear that he was against introducing a leverage ratio outside of the
Basle context, arguing that this would lead to competitive distortions due to differences in
accounting standards (Weber 2009b). According to the OECD (2010, p. 8), German
banks’ capitalisation was very low on a non-risk weighted basis, meaning that the intro-
duction of such a ratio would constrain their lending capacity much more than that of
banks domiciled elsewhere. In the end, Weber voiced relief that the G20 decided to in-
corporate the leverage ratio in pillar 2 of the Basle accord and that G20 members com-
mitted to implement Basle II by 2011. What mattered for Germany was strict implemen-
tation of Basle rules, not their radical overhaul.
One particular bone of contention was the emphasis the US and the UK put on share-
holder capital in efforts to strengthen banks’ capital bases. With thousands of co-
operative and publicly owned (savings) banks, Germany has been hesitant to focus on
shareholder equity, fearing that the capital base of banks that are not publicly traded will
be treated less favourably, meaning that such banks would either have to raise additional
capital or curtail lending (Wilson 2009).
Roughly mirroring the German position, France has demonstrated strong support for
the Basle II framework (Noyer 2009b) while acknowledging the desirability of rules that
dampen the peaks and troughs of the lending cycle (Lagarde 2009a). It also is cautious
about Anglo-American proposals to increase the amount and quality of banking capital
(Irish Independent 2009), with French banks warning against ‘unfair competition’ be-
cause of rule changes in the lead-up to the Pittsburgh summit (Daneshkhu 2009).
In banking, then, the division of roles is different from that in accounting: France and
Germany have both been worried that the US would effectively opt out of the implicit
Basle commitment to formulate common rules for the banking sector. The US, never
having been too happy with Basle II in the first place, has continued to drag its feet. The
UK, while ultimately interested in a global deal (not least because it too is covered by EU
legislation in the field) has been willing to stand by while the US bargained to extract
concessions from France and Germany in return for a commitment to Basle II.
In parallel with the situation in accounting, the main lines of disagreement traced the
competitive fault lines between national financial industries. The easy regulatory lessons,
namely that capital blankets were too thin, have quickly been learned by all governments.
In contrast, the more difficult questions – how could regulatory capital be set in a way to
reflect expectations of future up- or down-turns? – have barely been touched upon in in-
ternational debates.
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4.3 Rating agencies
The triple-A ratings credit raters issued for credit derivatives in the run-up to the crisis quickly
became one of the most visible faults in the chain of events that brought the global financial
system down. The retrospective accusations against credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been
manifold: the use of quantitative models that relied on historical data, the lack of qualitative
judgements about overall market stability, and a business model in which CRAs faced a clear
conflict of interest, given that they were paid by the issuers of the securities they had to judge
and also made money by advising issuers on how to construct structured credit derivatives.
Of the cases discussed here, the area of credit rating agencies has seen the most leg-
islative action so far. The EU introduced a regulation in the field in November 2009 man-
dating registration of rating agencies active in the EU, publication of their methodologies,
and a prohibition on providing advisory services and ratings for products about which
they have insufficient information. As argued below, determined collective action from
European governments in this field – contrary to the other cases discussed here – can be
traced directly to the absence of important European rating agencies.
With the passing of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act by Congress in 2006, US
authorities had already strengthened CRA oversight and recordkeeping-requirements in
response to the WorldCom and Enron scandals (US Government Accountability Office
2009). The SEC introduced further regulation at the end of 2008 warning, however, that
excessive government intervention would unintentionally legitimate ratings and stimulate
undue reliance on them (SEC Working Group 2008; US Government Accountability Of-
fice 2009). Rating methods henceforth had to be more transparent and the direct reference
to specific ratings in ancillary legislation was weakened (Bos 2008). The following year,
the SEC started work on CRA requirements to differentiate between structured and un-
structured products and CRA business models, which many observers had argued had
generated perverse incentives (Department of the Treasury 2009a, p. 46).
Unsurprisingly, US authorities were unhappy about EU oversight over CRAs (Beary
2009), arguing that they themselves were already taking the appropriate (and necessary)
steps to make sure that henceforth, CRA activities would be in compliance with G20
agreements (Department of the Treasury 2009a, p. 88). They stressed the need for inter-
national consistency in CRA oversight – meaning that alternatives to the US regime were
generally unwelcome.
In the case of CRAs, the UK followed the line set out by big continental EU member
states, eventually agreeing to independent EU rules. At the same time, the FSA warned
that adaptations of the rating regime itself would not banish pro-cyclicality; changes to
accounting standards and calculations of bank capital were more likely to achieve the de-
sired results. Interestingly, this position reflects a deeper concern about the underlying
self-reflexivity of ratings and the attendant limits to reforms in this area than other gov-
ernments had admitted to. As was true for accounting standards, the UK position ap-
peared more principled in this respect than the other three.
France and Germany, finally, took rather similar positions again, which have largely
been incorporated into the EU legislation in the field. Sarkozy (2009), in a joint press
conference with Merkel, emphasized CRA failures as a root cause of the crisis. The list of
demands was in principle consistent with what other counties had asked for: addressing
conflicts of interest and more transparency on methodologies, conduct and performance
(cf. Fillon 2009; Lagarde 2009b).
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Two aspects of regulatory reform initiatives surrounding CRAs stand out when they
are compared to those in accounting and capital adequacy rules. First, new rules were
forthcoming much more quickly, and governments have been willing to embark on legis-
lative reform on their own instead of waiting for global agreement to emerge. As an in-
dustry, CRAs are much less relevant (and politically powerful) than banks, stock ex-
changes and other financial firms. That made them easy targets (Sinclair 2010), even if
again reforms by and large missed the more fundamental problems about the role of credit
ratings in reflexive markets. Second, in global reform debates competitive issues played
no role, given that the credit rating industry is largely domiciled in the US and was gov-
erned by US rules. In Europe, there were no established industry interests that could im-
pede reform. Hence CRA regulation generated limited collective action problems, and EU
governments were free to pursue their own policy preferences.
4.4 Credit derivatives
Over-the-counter credit derivatives, in particular collateralized debt-obligations (CDOs) re-
packaging and –tranching mortgages and credit default swaps, have been vilified as the
toxic waste contaminating banks’ balance sheets (see Mügge 2010a). Most criticisms have
concentrated on the intransparency of credit derivatives, which has made it impossible for
counterparties, investors, supervisors and internal risk managers to assess a financial institu-
tion’s exposure. In addition, the complexity of credit derivatives has meant that, even if all
information were available to all parties, the net of exposures they weave together intercon-
nects institutions throughout the financial system too tightly. In consequence, problems at
individual institutions can evolve into systemic crisis much more easily.
What have been the four countries’ positions concerning regulatory responses to the
systemic risks posed by unregulated markets for credit derivatives? In principle, govern-
ment positions in this area are more closely aligned than in the other three cases. All
identify and seek to tackle two key problems in this domain. First, they diagnose a lack of
transparency in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. Neither regulators and
supervisors nor market participants themselves had sufficient information to assess insti-
tutions’ exposures. Second, the lack of a central counterparty made derivatives trading
needlessly risky by directly exposing creditors to losses should counterparties default on
their commitments. As laid out below, however, strong differences emerged over who
should fill these information and infrastructure gaps and, crucially, where institutions
playing such a role should be located.
Geithner (2009) clearly acknowledged that credit derivatives had been an important
source of market turmoil and that therefore, they and the institutions that deal in them
should fall under government regulation. In the concrete treatment he distinguished be-
tween standardized and non-standardized contracts. The former, in particular simple
credit default swaps (CDS), should be traded on exchanges, much like interest rate and
exchange rate derivatives (Department of the Treasury 2009a, 2009b). Given not only the
transparency that brings, but also the enhanced security through the presence of the cen-
tral counterparty, panics such as those following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and
AIG might be avoided. In this light, Geithner advocated the greater use of standardized
contracts as replacements for OTC-trades without, however, proposing specific legal in-
struments to spur a shift in participants’ behaviour. According to US plans, non-stan-
Absent alternatives and insider interests in post-crisis financial reform 333
dardized derivatives would have to be reported to trade repositories. All in all, the goal
has been to increase market transparency.
Other countries had somewhat less faith in efforts to increase transparency through en-
hanced information provision and central clearing, not least because many OTC-derivatives
have been too idiosyncratic to allow on-exchange trading (Financial Services Authority
2009, p. 83). Nevertheless, both the Bank of England and the FSA strongly supported the
use of central counterparties where possible (Tucker 2009). For the (possibly substantial)
remainder of credit derivatives, UK authorities proposed risk minimization through bilateral
collateralization and risk-appropriate capital charges (HM Treasury 2009, pp. 80f).
In contrast to the regulation of CRAs, in derivatives market cross-border cooperation
is essential as otherwise, traders can move contentious business to more lightly regulated
jurisdictions. Hence the US put international coordination of measures central. So far,
such cooperation has largely floundered on differences over where and by whom credit
default swaps (CDS), the likely candidate for on-exchange trading in the world of credit
derivatives, should be traded. The EU Commission proposed to have euro-denominated
CDS cleared in the euro-zone, a move that unsurprisingly displeased the UK (Financial
Services Authority 2009, p. 83) given that City-based firms would thus miss significant
clearing business. In December 2008 NYSE Liffe and LCH.Clearnet had launched a CDS
clearer in London, which failed to attract any business, however (Grant/Tait 2009a). In
February of the following year, LCH.Clearnet again launched an initiative, this time on
its own. To pre-empt problems stemming from restrictive EU legislation, the service was
planned to be operated through Paris-based subsidiary LCH.Clearnet SA (Grant 2009b).
Indeed, France had been most vocal in lobbying the ECB to push for a central euro-
zone counterparty for OTC derivatives (Grant/Tait 2009b). An earlier attempt to push
through such plans had failed due to the resistance of large traders, who preferred clear-
ing all their trades with one single (by default American) CCP in order to allow netting of
positions and hence lower capital charges (Jones 2009). Early in 2009 EU plans did take
shape, however (EurActiv 2009), and the European Commission set a July 2009 deadline
for central clearing of CDS contracts in Europe (Grant 2009a).
Ever since, intra-European discussions have been shaped by governments’ attempts
to attract euro-derivatives clearing to their financial centres (for France, that became par-
ticularly clear through a leaked document of the Banque de France, see Hollinger/
Daneshkhu 2009). Deutsche Börse launched a central clearing service (Eurex Clearing) in
July 2009 (Tait/Grant 2009), now competing head-on with Clearnet in France and the US
Intercontinental Exchange (Grant/Tait 2009a; Weitzman 2009). Agreement on European
rules that might decide the race among these is still being drafted in the summer of 2010
(Clark/Cameron 2010).
Unsurprisingly, US authorities saw little need for European public authorities to channel
clearing business to any particular clearing house (Beary 2009), suspecting that without spe-
cific rules, much business would gravitate towards US clearers and thus come under their
purview. As Jouvet, head of the French regulator, pointed out in July 2009, precisely that
might be the result of the intra-European stalemate (Hollinger/Daneshkhu 2009).
In the case of credit derivatives, the competitive interests of firms who contend for
potential future clearing business is even clearer than in the other cases discussed, given
the concentration in the sector. Protagonists in this debate make few pretences to pruden-
tial considerations underlying their positions. In contrast to for example banking services,
business gravitates to central platforms. Once a central clearer has been established, expe-
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rience shows that competition is very limited. Hence, the challenge from the perspective
of public authorities is not to fine-tune a playing field but to give their own champion a
regulatory head start. Arcane rules matter less than a simple mandating of where clearing
may and may not take place. In this way, the industry structure fostered an unusually
blunt international debate.
5. Conclusion: comparing reforms across policy-domains
How do reform measures, proposals and debates compare across the four domains dis-
cussed? How much explanatory power do the factors outlined at the beginning of this pa-
per have? And how far have reform positions departed from previous regulatory ortho-
doxy? Across all domains, reform proposals have been timid compared to the critical
analyses of pre-crisis regulation and financial markets that have been tabled. Virtually
none of the proposals have put forward serious alternatives to the market-mechanism as
the cornerstone of regulatory practice. To be fair, in three of the four domains, there are
few alternatives to draw on. Thus even though fair-value accounting has drawn much
criticism, it remains unclear what a viable replacement would be. The most obvious alter-
native is a reversion to the use of book-values for securities. But unless such a shift were
pursued wholeheartedly, it would generate inconsistencies even within banks’ individual
balance sheets, not to mention enormous possibilities for accounting arbitrage, as it
would then probably become known. At the very least, the selective use of book value
and market value for securities would unmask the misleading pretence of accounting
standards that they could provide objective measures of value. That would be honest
enough, but thus far, even the critics of mark-to-market accounting have refused to with-
draw support for FVA.
Similarly, regulators and supervisors agree that banks’ capital charges need to reflect
systemic risks. Proposals to build macro-prudential elements into capital charges are sen-
sible in this respect, but again, it remains unclear how this could be done without shat-
tering the illusion that at least parts of financial systems could function without overt
public intervention. After all, just when an up-swing would end (and hence capital re-
quirements would have to be relaxed) would be for supervisors to decide, and given mar-
ket reflexivity, there is no obvious indicator on which they could rely. Given the eco-
nomic importance of credit provision, the identification of such turning points will inevi-
tably be politicized and with it the governance of the banking sector itself. Again, poli-
cymakers thus far refuse to spell out the concrete consequences of abstract ideas about the
internalization of systemic risk in individual banks’ capital charges.
Also the discussion about CRAs has, seen in this light, concentrated on issues that are
marginal to the endogeneity of ratings. One proposal that falls outside this category, how-
ever, is the simple suggestion to oblige CRAs to rate only those products for which reli-
able methodologies exist. With such a step, complex credit derivatives would simply re-
main unrated – which makes sense given the inherent unpredictability of their value and
potential losses. More importantly, it would be a regulatory admission that for some secu-
rities, we can calculate default probabilities within an acceptable margin of error, and for
others, we cannot. Needless to say, if such reasoning were accepted in the world of
CRAs, it would put banking regulators under serious pressure to explain why, if CRAs
cannot rate for example CDOs, banks should be expected to do better.
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OTC derivatives, finally, remain an issue policymakers view with considerable cir-
cumspection. Given that infinite varieties are thinkable, and that the distinction between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ derivatives is difficult, if not impossible, to make (Bryan/Rafferty 2005;
Mügge 2009), the outright prohibition of particular OTC products is hardly considered.
Instead, proposals rely on measures to increase transparency, capital charges, market li-
quidity and insurance through central counterparties.
The availability of regulatory alternatives has thus limited the reform proposals that
governments have been able to put on the table. What has been most remarkable in the
differences of opinion between them, however, has been government willingness to de-
fend the competitive interests of national financial industries. Save in the case of credit
rating agencies, where the concentration of firms in the US made competitive struggles a
non-issue, government positions have neatly traced the regulatory preferences of national
firms. What mattered here was not so much the absolute level of profits they could earn,
but firms’ market position relative to foreign competitors – summed up in concerns about
‘level playing fields’. This has been true not only for banks, as shown in the accounting
standards and capital adequacy rules-cases, but also for clearers, as evidenced in the case
of derivatives regulation. However much may change in the regulation of the financial
sectors – rule setting remains a game dominated by insider interests.
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